How did the EU resist arm-twisting at the G7
The G7 Summit in Hiroshima marked the important return of the G7 but also the stage of new transatlantic tensions with respect to China.
The G7 Summit was an important data point to gauge the true US china policy after tentative steps to create the conditions for appeasement (speeches by Yellen, Sullivan) and the beginning of bilateral meetings in preparation of possible Xi-Biden meeting later this year.
But it was important to assess whether the US was trying to pursue something more aggressive on the policy front and the extent to which it was using the G7 to expand the reach of its China policy.
The main G7 Communique was rather limited in position that were specifically directed at China but the US insisted on a separate statement on Economic resilience and Economic Security , which had direct references to:
· Export controls: “We will further strengthen multilateral efforts to cooperate in the field of export controls to ensure gaps in our dual use technology protection ecosystem cannot be exploited”.
· Outwards investment screening: “We recognize that appropriate measures designed to address risks from outbound investment could be important to complement existing tools of targeted controls on exports and inbound investments, which work together to protect our sensitive technologies from being used in ways that threaten international peace and security”.
While both were formulated in less aggressive terms than originally expected in earlier draft statements, the G7 leaders agreed that this is an ongoing area hat could be further developed: “We will also continue to coordinate, share lessons, and seek to align our approaches where feasible to maximize the effectiveness of our efforts”.
These references were the result of intense jockeying between the US and the EU (France, Germany and Italy), which were rather united. Unlike the Netherlands, which had been compelled to fold on export controls of semi-conductor lithography, Germany has been resisting the US high-performance semiconductor ban. In Germany, Economy Minister Robert Habeck supports the outbound investment screenings, whereas Chancellor Scholz and Finance Minister Lindner do not, reflecting intense tensions inside the coalition on the position to take between China and the US.
Furthermore, Germany, France, and other Member States are trying to put a break on EU Commission President von der Leyen’s proposal for secondary sanctions against Chinese companies in breach of the EU sanctions against Russia. Berlin has also played down reports about a possible ban on exports of chips manufacturing related chemicals to China (the volume of total Chinese chemical imports from Germany amounted to around $15 billion in 2020).
The position of European countries in the G7 is particularly relevant to the discussions on the same issue that will dominate the European Council meeting on June 23-24. In a letter to governments, the EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs (name?) set out the framework for these discussions, which are currently taking place at ministerial level. He identified three lines of action:
· On values: the EU must counter this discourse (not clear what “this discourse” refers to) and compete with the Chinese model;
· On economy: the EU needs to reduce risks and excessive dependencies by diversifying supply chains, controlling inward and possibly outward investment, and developing an anti-coercion instrument;
· On security: the EU must work with China and the US to maintain the status quo and de-escalate tensions regarding Taiwan. EU-China relations will not develop if China does not press Russia to withdraw from Ukraine.
Ukraine’s charm offensive
Zelensky's trip was perhaps the strongest feature of the Summit. In the Leaders’ Statement on Ukraine, they pledged to mobilize “all our policy instruments and, together with Ukraine, make every effort to bring a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine as soon as possible.”
· The prior US announcement that it would allow allies to send F-16s to Ukraine and that it would participate in the training of Ukrainian pilots enabled Zelensky's diplomatic tour to reach its goal.
· Already on May 16, UK Prime Minister Sunak and Nentherlands Prime Minister Rutte jointly announced their intention to build an "international coalition" to help Ukraine obtain F-16s.
· According to a senior Ukrainian official, four European countries have indicated their readiness to send some of their F-16s to Ukraine: Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and Norway. Poland already has committed to giving Ukraine between 11 to 19 Mig-29 planes (already supplied 4); Slovakia committed to sending 13 Mig-29’s.
· Nine countries in Europe have the F-16 in their fleet and some have started to prepare for deliveries starting with the Netherlands where the trauma of the MH. But some of them, such as Poland, Greece and Romania may agree to send them to Ukraine only in exchange for F-35s.
· France and the UK have also said they will train Ukrainian pilots. France will use its Mirage jet fighters and it has a fleet that that is about to be retired that could easily be given out to Ukraine as part of a broader coalition.