Macron boldly calls for a new Convention
The speech puts the institutional and democratic debate back at the heart of European integration when it had been sidelines for years
Macron gave an important speech before the European Parliament today in Strasbourg. Here is a quick explainer of Macron’s important Speech in Strasbourg today and what it could mean for the future of Europe:
"je veux dire clairement aujourd'hui que l'une des voies de cette réforme est la convocation d'une convention de révision des traités. C'est une proposition du Parlement européen, et je l'approuve."
The real danger of the conference on the future of Europe that Macron has called for in 2019 was that it would end very modest set of proposals namely only the agreement to transnational lists. This would have major disappointment but also not a great surprise given the challenge getting the conference of the ground and the extreme politicization of its work by the European Parliament. The explicit call for a convention by Macron put the institutional agenda right in the heart of this conference and potentially opens a new chapter for European integration and institutional debates.
"Lorsqu'on commence des exercices aussi ambitieux, si on n'a pas une idée claire au début, il est rare qu'elle le soit davantage à la fin. Et donc, dès les prochaines semaines, nous aurons à définir les préalables. Je souhaiterais que nous en discutions avec l'audace et la liberté nécessaires dès le Conseil Européen du mois de juin"
Importantly, Macron doesn’t plan to wait and is intent to put pressure on his peers as early as June to get the conversation rolling. Given the stakes, that might be perceived as too aggressive, especially in countries that are barely coping with the war in Ukraine and its economic and energy consequences. More than a rapid start, Macron also wants the objectives and deliverables to be well framed so as to avoid a Convention without a clear purpose. A lesson he has learned from the past including from his failed attempt at the Conventions Démocratiques or from the Conference on the Future of Europe, which was nearly botched several times.
"Ceci supposera d'avancer pour plus de simplicité. Nous connaissons la voie, c’est-à-dire avancer en continuant de généraliser le vote à la majorité qualifiée dans nos décisions pour nos principales politiques publiques."
The objective here is announced rather simply but is potentially far reaching. Expanding the scope of qualified majority decisions implies first a unanimous decision to do so. The real question is also how much Quid Pro Quo France is ready for. It is only fair to ask for Sanctions or tax decisions to be brought under unanimity but is France ready to lose its veto on Common Security and Defense policy. This will be a real test and one that countries doubtful of France’s intentions will be prompt to ask.
"les règles de tant de nos institutions reposaient sur des objectifs aujourd'hui devenus incomplets ne nous permettront pas de tenir face aux crises qui sont les nôtres et au défi historique, notre unité. Le plein emploi, l'objectif de croissance, la neutralité carbone, l'objectif de justice sociale doivent être au cœur des objectifs de nos institutions"
This is a less explicit reference to European rules but also to fundamental objectives and mandates of EU institutions. Interestingly, Macron refers openly to a broad range of objectives and to institutions without naming them, which may open the question of the ECB’s mandate. Indeed, a dual mandate of the ECB or one that would include Climate could be a really bold step.
"Ne plus craindre la différenciation, les avant-gardes, elles ont toujours été fécondes pour le projet européen. L'aspiration légitime de l'Ukraine, la Moldavie et de la Géorgie à rejoindre l'UE nous invitent à repenser notre géographie et l'organisation de notre continent."
France had really lost its theory of change for Europe in the last 5 years. Indeed, the idea of an avant-garde, a coalition of the willing has always been central to Delors and to France’s view of Europe. It was also particularly important after the enlargement of 2004, which France felt required an alternative to overcome the move eastward of Europe political power. Making the euro area the real beating heart of the EU was the plan but it largely failed. Macron’s last attempt to do so with the Meseberg declaration of 2018 was a resounding failure and since then, there was basically no integration of the euro area whatsoever and even the more modest agenda of banking and capital markets union remained largely blocked. Integration, including fiscal or the expansion of the European powers happened at 27 and not at 19.
That being said Macron is certainly right that the desire to accelerate enlargement must change that reality. With the Balkans, Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, the EU’s current structure must change.
"Soyons clairs, l'Union européenne, compte tenu de son niveau d'intégration et d'ambition, ne peut pas être à court terme le seul moyen de structurer le continent européen. Cette organisation permettrait aux nations européennes démocratiques adhérant à notre socle de valeurs de trouver un nouvel espace de coopération politique, de sécurité, de coopération en matière énergétique, de transport, d'investissements, de circulation des personnes..."
This is where Macron invokes Francois Mitterand’s idea of Political Community of Europe, an outer layer of European integration on top of the EU. He rightly stresses that Mitterand thought this union could Russia, it cannot be the case now. But Macron is careful not to set the boundaries (he is remarkably moot on Turkey) but he is also very explicit about the fact that the UK could join one such structure and that its purpose could include coordination in the field of security. Many will object that this is offering second class ticket to Ukraine but it is also certainly a much better transition into the EU that staying in the accession process for more than a decade. Macron’s opposition (as close as it got to a veto) to the opening of accession of the whole of the Western Balkans is an important precedent. Macron’s view is that Europe cannot enlarge before it deepens its integration and given that it is not fair to delay enlargement until Europe can integrate further, the only way to proceed is to create a holding structure that may in fact be permanent for countries that have no desire to join the full EU (the UK for example).
All in all, Macron had somewhat lost his place as the driver for European change and integration in the last few months. He surprisingly didn’t use France’s presidency of the EU to campaign hard on the matter during his own presidential election but he seems intent to open his second mandate but calls as bold as that he held at the beginning of his first mandate (Sorbonne et Athens speeches). The key question now is whether the current German government is better suited to respond to these bold calls and whether they are also prepared to challenge Macron’s blind-spots about federalism, about democratisation of the EU, about the real transfer of power to EU institutions. We should get a sense of the dynamics already at the June European Council (June 23/24) where a new French government will be in place potentially emboldening Macron’s European drive even further.